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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ELIMINATION OF THE JUVENILE
DEATH PENALTY-SUBSTITUTING MORAL JUDGMENT FOR A
TRUE NATIONAL CONSENSUS
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005)
Steven J. Wernick*

Respondent was convicted of first-degree murder for the torturous
abduction and drowning of a woman' and was sentenced to death upon the
recommendation of the jury.2 Respondent committed these brutal acts as
a seventeen year-old high school student.3 Despite his age, Respondent
was tried as an adult for his crimes.4 Respondent challenged the ruling,
contending that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence5 established that
execution ofjuvenile offenders amounted to cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment.6 The Missouri Supreme Court set aside the
sentence,7 holding that a national consensus had developed in opposition
to the execution of juvenile offenders.8 The Supreme Court granted
* This Comment is dedicated to my grandfather, Morris Wernick, a man whose passion for
life I strive to emulate. I thank him for giving me strong lineage and the determination to live life
to the fullest.
1. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1188 (2005). Respondent Christopher Simmons, with
the help of his friend Charles Benjamin, entered the home of Shirley Crook, abducted her, and
threw her off a bridge with her feet and hands bound together, drowning her in the river below. Id.
at 1187-88.
2. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003).
3. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1187.
4. Id. at 1188. Missouri state law gives jurisdiction to juvenile courts over children who
have violated a state law or municipal ordinance prior to attaining the age of seventeen years. Id.
(citing Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 211.021, 211.031 (2000)). The court did instruct the jury that
Respondent's age could be used as a mitigating factor in the penalty phase. Id. at 1188.
5. Id. at 1189. The Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia that execution of mentally
retarded persons amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 536
U.S. 304, 321 (2002). Simmons argued that the reasoning behind Atkins should apply equally to
the instant case. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1189.
6. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190. The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
7. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1189. The Missouri Supreme Court re-sentenced Simmons to "life
imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the Governor."
State ex rel. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 413. Simmons had previously made a motion in the trial
court, unsuccessfully, to set aside the conviction sentence on the grounds of ineffective assistance
at trial. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1189. On his first consolidated appeal of both the conviction and the
denial of postconviction relief, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's rulings.
State ex rel. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 399.
8. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1189.
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certiorari,9 and in affirming the decision, HELD, that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of capital punishment on offenders
under the age of eighteen at the time of offense.'°
The Eighth Amendment explicitly prohibits the imposition of cruel and
unusual punishment on criminal offenders." In addition to those acts
considered cruel and unusual at the time of adoption of the Bill of Rights,12
the Supreme Court measures the challenged punishment against "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 3 The Court relies foremost on well-established, objective indicia
of consensus.14 While the Court has ruled that the death penalty itself is not
unconstitutional 15 on a number of occasions, the Court has found the death
penalty to be cruel and unusual punishment for certain crimes or as
imposed on particular offenders. 6 As more challenges to the use of capital
punishment have arisen, the Court has increasingly shown its willingness
to introduce its own moral judgment in interpreting contemporary
standards of decency.' 7

9. Roper v. Simmons, 540 U.S. 1160, 1160 (2004). In light of theAtkins decision, the Court
was compelled to reconsider the issue of whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment
for juveniles. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.
10. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1200. The Court also held that the Fourteenth Amendment was
violated by imposing the death penalty on juveniles. Id.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This amendment precludes not only barbaric punishments, but
also those punishments found to be "'excessive' in relation to the crime committed." Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that the death penalty is excessive
punishment for the rape of an adult woman).
12. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1986) (explaining that, at a minimum,
those acts considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted are prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment). Acts considered cruel and unusual in 1789 included those practices
condemned under the common law of England. Id. at 406.
13. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 84, 100-01 (1958) (holding that denationalization violated the
Eighth Amendment when used as a punishment).
14. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192 (explaining that a preliminary review of objective indicia
of consensus provides the Court "essential instructions"). In determining whether a consensus exists
against the imposition of certain punishment, the Court leans primarily on the actions of state
legislatures. Id.Additional objective indicia of consensus include sentencing practices ofjuries and
the existence of a trend toward the elimination of a particular practice. Id. at 1194.
15. Coker, 433 U.S. at 591,592 (plurality opinion) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
206-07 (1976) (holding that imposition of the death penalty under the Georgia statutory system did
not violate the Eighth Amendment because it was neither a purposeless imposition of pain and
suffering nor a punishment severely disproportionate to the crime committed)).
16. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (surveying previous Supreme Court
cases in which the Court held that capital punishment was unconstitutional).
17. See id.at 1190-92 (majority opinion) (discussing previous cases in which the independent
judgment of the Court was brought to bear on the suitability of the death penalty). The Court has
further broadened its analysis of cruel and unusual punishment in recent cases to include the views
of the international community. See id. at 1198-1200.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/8
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In Coker v. Georgia,8 the Court first articulated its reliance on
independent moral judgment in addressing the suitability of the death
penalty.19 In Coker,the Court considered whether the death penalty is cruel
and unusual punishment for the rape of an adult woman.2' Petitioner,
having escaped from a local correctional facility, entered the home of an
adult woman and forcibly raped her at knifepoint.2t Petitioner was
convicted and sentenced to death by electrocution.22 On appeal, the Court
reversed, holding that the death penalty for the crime of rape of an adult
woman is a disproportionate and excessive punishment and is prohibited
under the Eighth Amendment.23
A plurality of the Court determined that broad legislative rejection24 of
imposition of the death penalty for rape confirmed the independent
judgment of the plurality.25 The plurality reasoned that rape should not be
punished by death because, unlike murder, it does not involve "the
unjustified taking of human life., 26 The dissent argued that the Court, in
considering its own moral judgment, extended its traditionally limited
role.27 While recognizing the primacy of objective factors,28 the plurality
18. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
19. See id. at 597. The Court asserted that "the Constitution contemplates that in the end our
own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under
the Eighth Amendment." Id.
20. Id.at 592.
21. Id.at 587.
22. Id. at 591. The trial court instructed the jury that in sentencing, it could consider whether
the offender had a prior record of conviction for a capital felony and whether the offender was
simultaneously committing a separate capital felony. Id.
at 587-88. Thejury found both aggravating
circumstances were present during the crime. Id.at 591.
23. Id.at 592.
24. Id. at 595-96. The Court found that Georgia was the only jurisdiction authorizing the
death penalty as punishment for the crime of rape of an adult woman. Id. Though sixteen states and
the federal government authorized capital punishment for the crime as of 1971, only Georgia, North
Carolina, and Louisiana maintained the death penalty in their revised statutes after Furman v.
Georgia.408 U.S. 238, 369 (1972) (holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional when applied
arbitrarily and striking down all the death penalty statutes then existing in the states). The latter two
had their statutes struck down because the death penalty was mandatory for all offenders. Id.
25. Id. at 597.
26. Id. at 598.
27. Id. at 604 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Language in earlier cases refers to the enhanced
deference owed to state legislatures where criminal punishment is concerned, as "'these are
peculiarly questions of legislative policy."' Id. at 613 n.8 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gore v.
United States, 357 U.S. 386,393 (1958)). According to the dissent, the simple fact that Georgia and
two other states were the only states at that time that authorized the death penalty for the crime of
rape should not detract from the deference afforded to legislative judgment. Id. at 616.
28. See id. at 592 (majority opinion) (explaining that objective factors should be relied upon
to the greatest possible extent). "Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be,
merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective
factorsby
to UF
the Law
maximum
possibleRepository,
extent." Id. 2006
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insisted on giving credence to its own judgment in determining when a
punishment is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.29
In Stanford v. Kentucky,3" a plurality of the Court explicitly rejected the
idea that its own independent judgment was relevant in the acceptability
of the imposition of capital punishment on juvenile offenders who were
sixteen and sev.nteen years of age at the time of the offense.3" In two
separate instances, petitioners committed brutal killings while participating
in a robbery.32 Both petitioners were tried as adults, convicted of murder,
and sentenced to death.3 3 Petitioners appealed the conviction, arguing that
"'evolving standards of decency"' prohibited the death penalty for all
juvenile offenders.34 In denying the appeals, the plurality refused to
consider its own judgment and held that petitioners failed to establish a
national consensus against imposition of the death penalty.35
The plurality in Stanford strongly rejected any notion that its job
36
involved shaping the contours of contemporary standards of decency.
Rather, the Court suggested that the best evidence of American societal
conceptions of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment lies in state
statutes 37 and, to a lesser degree, the sentencing practices of juries. 38 The

29. See id. at 612-13 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court departed from
precedent by making itself the ultimate arbiter of contemporary standards).
30. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
31. Id. at 378 (plurality opinion). The Court had already prohibited the death penalty for
juvenile offenders under the age of sixteen. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988)
(holding that such punishment was cruel and unconstitutional).
32. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 365-68 (majority opinion). The Court consolidated two murder
cases in which the petitioners were under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime. Id. at 364-65.
Petitioner Kevin Stanford was seventeen years and four months of age when he raped and killed
a gasoline station attendant during the commission of a robbery. Id. at 365. Petitioner Heath
Wilkins was sixteen years and six months of age when he stabbed a saleswoman to death in a
convenience store while robbing the store. Id. at 366.
33. Id. at 365-67.
34. Id. at 369 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 365 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
35. Id. at 380 (plurality opinion). The Court noted that petitioners face a heavy burden in
attacking the legislative judgments of state representatives. Id. at 373 (majority opinion) (citing
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976)). Petitioners failed to meet their heavy burden of
establishing a national consensus against the death penalty because a majority of states that
authorized the death penalty at that time permitted the execution ofjuvenile offenders sixteen years
of age and older. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373.
36. Id. at 378 (plurality opinion). The plurality reemphasized that the role of the Court is not
to interpret what the "'evolving standards of decency' . .. should be, but what they are." Id.
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
37. Id. at 370. "'[F]irst' among the 'objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward
a given sanction' are statutes passed by society's elected representatives." Id. (quoting McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987)).
38. See id. at 373-74 (discussing the reluctance of juries to impose death sentences on
minors).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/8
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dissent argued that the Eighth Amendment was designed to protect
fundamental rights from the power of popular decision-making,39 and it
called on the Court to employ its own judgment as ultimate arbiter.' The
Court disagreed, stating that the Eighth Amendment was intended to
protect individuals from the will of the Court as well as majoritarian
politics.41 Thus, in Stanford, the Court declined to rely on its own
judgment and upheld petitioners' convictions and sentences.42
Thirteen years later in Atkins v. Virginia,43 the Court once again leaned
on its own moral judgment to determine whether the execution of mentally
retarded offenders amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment." Petitioner had robbed and killed a man for no
apparent reason.45 Despite expert testimony regarding lack of mental
capacity, 4 petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death. 47 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the imposition of the
death penalty.48 However, on certiorari, the Court reversed, concluding that
"'evolving standards of decency"' had turned against imposition of the
49
death penalty for mentally retarded criminals.
The Court in Atkins stated that in cases in which there exists objective
evidence of a national consensus against the death penalty, the Court

39. See id. at 391-92 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "[T]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was
to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities... and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." Id.
(quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
40. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 391 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 604 n.2 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
41. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 379 (plurality opinion). The Court posited that by allowing justices
to pass judgment personally on the desires of the American public, the Court no longer acts as
judges of the law, but something more akin to "philosopher-kings." Id.
42. Id. at 378-80.
43. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
44. See id. at 313; see also id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the underlying
rationale for the Court's decision stemmed from its own moral judgment).
45. Id. at 307 (majority opinion). Petitioner Daryl Renard Atkins, along with William Jones,
abducted Eric Nesbitt at gunpoint, robbed him of his personal belongings, forced him to withdraw
additional cash, and then shot him eight times after driving him to an isolated area. Id.
46. Id. at 308. A forensic psychologist had evaluated petitioner and determined that his fullscale IQ was 59, qualifying him as mentally retarded. Id. at 309, 309 n.5.
47. Id. at 308-09.
48. Id. at 310. The Supreme Court of Virginia relied on the Court's decision just thirteen
years earlier in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that mentally retarded offenders
were not exempt from the death penalty because of their mental capacity). Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310.
49. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986)). The
Court announced that contemporary standards had significantly evolved in the intervening thirteen
years since the Court last considered the issue, as evidenced by the fact that since 1989 sixteen
states had affirmatively exempted the mentally retarded from capital punishment and the practice
had become
even in statesRepository,
permitting it.2006
Id. at 314-16.
Published
by UFunusual
Law Scholarship

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 8
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

imparts its own judgment to determine whether there may be reason to
deviate from the judgment of state legislatures.5 ° Despite argument from
the dissent that prisoners could easily feign mental retardation,5 the Court
reasoned that because of inherent mental deficiencies, imposing the death
penalty on mentally retarded offenders serves neither of the social goals
of deterrence and retribution.52 Thus, as in Coker, the Court considered its
own moral judgment in abolishing the death penalty for mentally retarded
offenders.53
Explicitly rejecting Stanford, the instant Court applied the Atkins
analysis for determining whether the Eighth Amendment precludes
imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders.54 In proclaiming that
"penological justifications for the death penalty" do not apply to juvenile
offenders,55 the instant Court held that execution of juvenile offenders was
inconsistent with evolving standards of decency. 6 Unlike the Court in
Stanford, the instant Court embraced its role in defining contemporary
standards and reaffirmed the notion that cruel and unusual punishment is
a concept subject to re-interpretation.57
50. Id. at 313.
51. Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. See id. at 318-19 (majority opinion). Since mentally retarded offenders who commit
murder do so with lesser culpability than other murderers by nature of the difference in mental
capacity, the goal of retribution would be better served by reserving the death penalty for those
murderers exhibiting heightened depravity of mind. Id. at 319. Also, the cognitive and behavioral
impairments that define mentally retarded individuals make them less aware and responsive to the
possible punishment of death, and therefore imposing the death penalty would not further the goal
of deterrence. Id. at 319-20.
53. See id. at 321 (referring to "'evolving standards of decency"' in applying the Eighth
Amendment) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986)).
54. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198 (2005). The Court asserted that Stanford was
inconsistent with Cokerin that the Stanford Court should have considered its independent judgment
on the "proportionality of the death penalty" to the crime and to the group of offenders being
considered. Id. In addition, the Court once again pointed to the rejection of the death penalty within
the international community as "significant confirmation" for its determination that the death
penalty amounted to cruel and unusual punishment for juvenile offenders. See id. at 1198-1200
(discussing the "stark reality" that only the U.S. continues to give official sanction to the death
penalty). For criticism of the inclusion of international law in Eighth Amendment analysis, see
Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen
Breyer-American University Washington College of Law, Jan. 13, 2005, available at
http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/O/IF2F7DC4757FDOIE85256F890068E6E
0?OpenDocument.
55. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1196. Citing research on the diminished culpability ofjuveniles,
the Court posited "that the penological justifications for the death penalty apply to [juveniles] with
lesser force than to adults." Id.
56. Id. at 1194. "A majority of States have rejected the imposition of the death penalty on
juvenile offenders under 18, and we now hold this is required by the Eighth Amendment." Id.
57. CompareStanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378-79 (1989), with Roper, 125 S. Ct. at
1198.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/8
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The instant Court began its analysis by evaluating the current status of
juvenile offenders within state statutes and courtrooms.58 The instant Court
identified thirty states that precluded the death penalty for juvenile
offenders, including twelve states that explicitly rejected the death penalty
altogether and eighteen of thirty-eight states that authorized the death
penalty by statute. 59 Even in the states that had not abolished the death
penalty by statute, the instant Court found evidence that juries rarely
imposed the death sentence on juvenile offenders.' The instant Court
stated that while only five states had taken affirmative action to abolish the
juvenile death penalty since Stanford, the consistent direction of the
change is significant.6"
In addition to objective indicia of national consensus, the Court
considered the proportionality of the death penalty forjuvenile offenders.62
The instant Court stated that because capital punishment entails the
ultimate penalty of death, it must be limited to the most severely depraved
criminals.6 3 The instant Court identified three major differences between
juveniles and adults that demonstrate diminished culpability in juvenile
offenders.' Based on these differences, the instant Court dismissed the
idea that juveniles could be among the worst offenders in society.65 While
youth is considered a mitigating factor in sentencing guidelines, the instant
Court stated that juries are too likely swayed by evidence of the brutal
nature of murder to adequately consider mitigating arguments.' Thus, the
58. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192-93.
59. Id. at 1192.
60. Id. Since Stanford, only six states had executed offenders who had committed murder
while under the age of eighteen. Id. (citing VICrOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENiLE DEATH PENALTY
TODAY: DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973-FEBRUARY

28, 2005, 15-23 (2005), http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/documents/juvdeath.pdf).
61. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1193. While the change in state statutes prohibiting the death penalty
for juvenile offenders over a fifteen-year period was not nearly as significant as that between Penry
and Atkins over a twelve-year period, the instant Court reasoned that the impropriety of executing
juveniles had already achieved a longstanding recognition. Id.
62. See id. at 1194-98 (discussing the differences between juveniles and adult offenders and
why these differences prevent juveniles from falling into the "'narrow category"' of "extreme
culpability") (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
63. Id. at 1194 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
64. Id. at 1195. The first major difference noted was a lack of maturity and sense of
responsibility in juveniles. Id. The second major difference discussed was a vulnerability to
negative influences predicated on a lack of financial and legal freedom to escape from negative
environments. Id. Third, the instant Court noted that juveniles still have a transitory personality and
undefined character. Id. Thus, the Court reasoned that the social purposes of the death
penalty-retribution and deterrence--are without merit when applied to juveniles. Id. at 1196.
65. Id. at 1195.
66. Id. at 1197. The instant Court acknowledged that the risk of bias could be corrected by
the creation of a rule of evidence ensuring that the youth factor was not overlooked by the jury, but
nevertheless
that a categorical
bar against
the death penalty is necessary given the Court's
Published
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instant Court's own judgment confirmed its findings of a national
consensus against the execution of juvenile offenders.67
In a thorough dissent, Justice O'Connor agreed with the instant Court's
inclusion of its own independent judgment, but concluded that no genuine
national consensus exists to support a categorical bar against the execution
of juvenile offenders.68 In distinguishing the instant case from Atkins,
Justice O'Connor stated that while objective indicia of consensus were
weak in both cases, the moral proportionality argument in Atkins provided
compelling evidence69 to overcome the "lingering ambiguities" of national
consensus.7° Justice O'Connor argued that the instant Court erred in
substituting its moral weight for the legislative judgments of roughly half
of the states in the Union.71
Joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia
wrote a dissent chastising the instant Court for imposing its own views on
the juvenile death penalty in overruling Stanford.7 2 Justice Scalia argued
that the Supreme Court should not play a role in defining evolving
standards where those standards are readily discernable from state
statutes.73 Justice Scalia suggested that the objective evidence offered by
the instant Court failed to demonstrate a true national consensus against
the execution of juvenile offenders.74 Furthermore, Justice Scalia argued
that subtle changes in public approval in the fifteen years since Stanford
do not warrant a categorical bar on imposing the death penalty on juvenile
offenders, considering that75 support for the death penalty has surged and
waned throughout history.

"larger concerns." Id.
67. See id. at 1194.
68. Id. at 1206 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
69. See id. at 1214 (explaining that diminished culpability in mentally retarded offenders is
always present because of inherent mental impairments that define the condition of the group, while
the culpability of juveniles may differ depending on the maturity level of the individual).
70. Id. at 1212. While the moral proportionality argument in Atkins decisively bolstered the
findings of a national consensus against the death penalty, Justice O'Connor argued that "the
proportionality argument [in the instant case] is so flawed that it can be given little, if any,
analytical weight-it proves too weak to resolve the lingering ambiguities in the objective evidence
of legislative consensus." Id.
71. Id. at 1211.
72. See id. at 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court says in so many words that what our
people's laws say about the issue does not ... matter."). Justice Scalia argued that the Eighth
Amendment does not give the Court the responsibility of "sole arbiter" of the nation's moral
standards. Id.
73. Id. at 1222.
74. Id. at 1218. Scalia argued that eighteen states with legislation against the execution of
juvenile offenders did not constitute a national consensus. Id. Historically, the Court has required
"overwhelming opposition to a challenged practice" over many years. Id.
75. Id. at 1220. Scalia disagreed that recent legislation in four states prohibiting the death 8
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/8
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In relying foremost on its own independent judgment, the instant Court
has expanded its role in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.76 Consequently,
the instant Court has diminished the primacy of objective indicia of
consensus in defining contemporary standards of decency.77 Purporting to
follow Atkins,7" the instant Court has reached beyond its traditional role as
interpreter of evolving standards of decency, asserting its willingness to
revisit questions of cruel and unusual punishment in light of the views of
the majority.79
The instant Court has departed from precedent by downplaying the
absence of overwhelming opposition to the imposition of a particular
punishment.8 0 Unlike Coker, where every state except one had abolished
the death penalty for rape," the instant Court relied on evidence of
legislation prohibiting the juvenile death penalty in a debatable majority
of states to demonstrate a national consensus against its use. 2 In addition,

penalty was significant. Id.; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 854-55 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the revival of the death penalty in state statutes after 1972).
76. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198; see also id. at 1206 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the rule announced by the instant Court ultimately is based on the Court's own subjective views).
77. See id. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 1192 (majority opinion). However, while a wave of legislation was passed
barring the execution of mentally retarded offenders in the thirteen years between Penry andAtkins,
see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-16 (2002), only five states (four by statute and one by
judicial decree) took specific steps to abolish the juvenile death penalty in the fifteen years between
Stanford and the instant case. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1193.
79. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court, by invoking
its own moral judgment, has deemed itself the sole arbitrator of the Nation's moral standards).
Justice Scalia went as far as to call the Court's opinion a mockery of Alexander Hamilton's
expectations of a traditional judiciary, "'bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve
to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them."' Id. (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)).
80. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192-93. Justice Scalia pointed out that in previous cases,
including Coker, where the death penalty was deemed cruel and unusual as applied to certain
crimes or groups of offenders, the Court cited unanimous or near-unanimous rejection by the states.
Id. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Conversely, forty-two percent of death penalty states objecting
to its imposition on juvenile offenders by statute was not convincing in Stanford. Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989).
81. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-94 (1977).
82. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even including states that have
abandoned the death penalty altogether, only sixty percent of states form the so-called consensus.
See id. at 1192 (majority opinion). Considering the ebbs and flows in popular support of the death
penalty throughout American history, inferring a national consensus from this evidence is
problematic. Should support for execution ofjuvenile offenders gain momentum in the future, the
categorical bar against its implementation would be incredibly difficult to remove. See Robin M.A.
Weeks, Note, Comparing Children to the Mentally Retarded: How the Decision in Atkins v.
Virginia Will Affect the Execution of Juvenile Offenders, 17 BYu J. PUB. L. 451, 480-81 (2003)
(discussing what could occur if society evolves backwards). "The main problem seems to be that
traditional analysis of the evolving standards of decency does not leave room for regression." Id.
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the instant Court conceded that the evidence in the instant case was not as
strong as in Atkins.83 Thus, the instant Court has broadened the concept of
a national consensus in defining contemporary standards of decency.'"
In holding that execution of juvenile offenders is cruel and unusual
punishment without strong evidence of a national consensus, the instant
Court has elevated the importance of moral proportionality analysis over
objective indicia of consensus in determining contemporary standards.85
While Coker and its progeny acknowledge the importance of independent
moral judgment, 6 Coker requires that objective indicia of consensus be
given maximum weight in deciding whether punishment is cruel and
unusual.87 The instant Court ignored this overt limitation, substituting its
own judgment in place of profound evidence of a national consensus.88
In openly rejecting Stanford,8 9 the instant Court emphasized the moral
proportionality argument used in Atkins to establish a categorical bar
against the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders.' ° The
Court in Atkins found an unyielding connection, by definition, between
mental retardation and diminished culpability.9" However, the instant
Court asserted that juveniles cannot be among the worst offenders because
at 481.
83. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1193 (referring to the change as "less dramatic" but nevertheless
significant). While the total number of states prohibiting execution of juveniles was equivalent to
the number of states prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded when Atkins was decided,
the instant Court observed that the rate of abolition of the death penalty for mentally retarded
offenders was much higher than in the instant case. Id.
84. See id. at 1192-93.
85. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
86. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 597; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002)
(describing the use of independent judgment to determine whether reason exists to disagree with
the decision reached by the legislature and public).
87. See Coker,433 U.S. at 592. Furthermore, Stanford and Gregg placed the burden of proof
on the offender to demonstrate an overwhelming national consensus against the imposition of the
death penalty on juvenile offenders. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 371 (1989); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976). The instant Court transferred the burden of proof to the state
to demonstrate the existence of a national consensus in favor of capital punishment. See Roper, 125
S. Ct. at 1194 (citing the state's failure to show national consensus in favor ofjuvenile execution).
This change has a significant effect in the instant case considering the number of states still
authorizing the juvenile death penalty. See id. at 1200 (providing a list of states allowing the
execution of juveniles).
88. See id. at 1222 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a court is limited to identifying a
moral consensus among the public); see also Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378 (finding that the Court has
no authority under the Eighth Amendment to substitute its own beliefs for society's uncertainty).
89. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
90. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1197. Capital punishment must be reserved for those individuals
whose actions fall within "'a narrow category of the most serious crimes"' and who demonstrate
a culpability making them "'the most deserving of execution."' See id. at 1194 (quoting Atkins, 536
U.S. at 319).
91. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
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they are, on average, more susceptible to irresponsible behavior, negative
influences, and evolving personality traits.9 2 Surely, capital punishment
should be reserved for the most deserving of offenders who have
committed heinous crimes.9 3 Yet, the instant Court has removed juveniles
from that class regardless of the maturity and depravity demonstrated by
a particular offender.94
The instant Court rejected the ability of sentencing juries to account for
age as a mitigating factor.95 While the Court in Stanford found that the
criminal justice systems among the states provide for individualized
sentencing procedures for juvenile offenders,96 the instant Court decided
that juries can no longer be trusted to avoid the prejudicial impact of
emotional evidence.97 The instant Court acknowledged that bias could be
corrected by special jury instructions, but nevertheless chose to eliminate
the risk altogether." Thus, the instant Court used its own moral judgment
to override the legislatures of roughly half the states that authorize juries
to impose the death penalty.100
Additionally, by leaning so heavily on the subjective views of its nine
members, the instant Court has expanded the notion that the Eighth
Amendment is open to constant re-interpretation.0 For example, the

92. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1195. The instant Court does not claim that the differences
between adults and juveniles are always present, but rather that juveniles are merely more
susceptible to these characteristics that lead to diminished culpability. See id. (discussing the
transitory recklessness of juveniles).
93. See David McCord, Imagininga RetributivistAlternativeto CapitalPunishment,50 FLA.
L. REv. 1, 34 (1998) (stating that in accordance with society's retributive impulse, the death penalty
"vindicates the expressive need to separate highest condemnation offenses from the mass of less
heinous crimes").
94. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1197. The instant Court drew a line at eighteen despite admission
that "[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns
18. By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will
never reach." Id. For example, Justice Scalia convincingly stated that the petitioner in the instant
case demonstrated heightened depravity of mind and culpability through his callous descriptions
of "the murder he planned to commit." Id. at 1223 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. See id. at 1197 (arguing that juries would be swayed by the brutality of the crime and
thereby give less weight to mitigating factors).
96. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374-76 (1989).
97. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1197; but cf. id. at 1224 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
fact that juries rarely choose to execute juvenile offenders is a sign that juries do have the ability
to take age into account as a mitigating factor).
98. See id. at 1197 (majority opinion).
99. See id.(explaining that such a solution would not address the Court's "larger concerns").
100. See id. at 1198; see also id. at 1206 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
101. While the Court has long looked to "evolving standards" of decency in deciding Eighth
Amendment challenges, constant re-interpretation undermines the system of stare decises, subjects
the law to trends in public opinion, and ignores the history of support for the death penalty. See
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 854-55 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the
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instant Court relied on certain sociological studies to support its opinion
regarding diminished culpability of juveniles while ignoring conflicting
studies.102 The instant Court could have easily emphasized the conflicting
evidence to argue that chronological age is not inherently determinative of
mental capacity.l13 Thus, the instant Court has opened the door further for
future challenges to the death penalty by other groups of offenders who
have found support in a comer of academia sympathetic to their plight.
In moving from objective to subjective criteria, the instant Court has
expanded the scope of Atkins by substituting its own moral judgment for
a true national consensus against the juvenile death penalty. While Coker
establishes the legitimacy of the Court's independent judgment as a
significant factor in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,1 " the instant
Court's analysis merely confirmed the viewpoints of a majority of its
members. 05 This disregard for objective indicia of consensus has chipped
away at traditional deference to state legislatures' 6 and has created an
Eighth Amendment subject to the beliefs of individual justices." 7

danger of inferring a settled societal consensus regarding the death penalty).
102. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1222 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining the highly discriminatory
fashion in which the Court chose its statistics). "In other words, all the Court has done today, to
borrow from another context, is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out its friends." Id.
at 1223 (citing Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
103. See id. at 1223 (describing studies contradicting the Court's conclusions).
104. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion).
105. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198; see also id. at 1206 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 1222 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that legislatures are best suited to respond
to moral values regarding criminal punishment because they are comprised of democratically
elected representatives).
107. See id. at 1230 (positing that Eighth Amendment decisions have become little more than
a "show of hands" reflecting current justices' ideology).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/8

12

